Abstract. This paper asks whether patents over-compensate innovators. I develop a simple and flexible model of the optimal strength of intellectual property protection and use what empirical evidence is available to calibrate the model. This provides benchmarks to evaluate whether the strength of patent protection is currently too high, too low, or is indeed optimal. The strength of protection is defined as the ratio between the discounted profits innovators actually obtain given the limits of patent protection and the discounted profits they would hypothetically obtain with complete, infinitely lived monopoly control over their inventions. In the calibration, the key parameter is the elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to investment in research. This elasticity has been estimated in several empirical studies: most estimates cluster between .5 and .7. In the baseline model of stand-alone innovations, it turns out that the strength of protection should be equal to this elasticity. In reality, it seems quite unlikely that the representative patentee gets more than two thirds of the hypothetical profits he would get with complete, infinitely lived monopoly control over his invention. In fact, I argue that the representative patentee probably obtains less than a half of those profits. This suggests that the over-reward hypothesis is not supported by the data. Moving beyond the baseline model, I discuss a number of additional effects that influence the benchmark strength of protection. Some of these effects are difficult to assess empirically. However, even accounting for the additional effects, a preponderance of the evidence suggests that the representative patentee is not over-compensated.
Introduction
The strength of intellectual property protection has been on the rise in the last 25 years. In most developing countries and also in some industrialized countries, the adoption of the TRIPs agreement required major reforms that extended the coverage of patent protection to the pharmaceutical, food and chemical industries, strengthened the enforcement of intellectual property rights, and extended the patent term to 20 years (McCalman, 2001 ). In the US, the creation in 1982 of new Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) providing a unified judicial appellate authority for all patent cases resulted in broader interpretation of the "doctrine of equivalents," an increase in the probability that litigated patents are held valid, and a rise in damages awarded for patent infringement (Jaffe, 2000) . Moreover, the Sonny Bono Act of 1998 retroactively extended the terms of copyright for an additional 20 years (Varian, 2005) . In certain countries, the realm of patentability has been broadened well beyond the requirements of the TRIPs agreement: there are now thousands of patents for living organisms, gene sequences, software programs, business methods etc. None of these inventions would have been patentable in the 1970s (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004) . Concerns have been raised that intellectual property protection may be excessively strong by now, and these concerns are increasingly voiced by economists. This paper asks whether intellectual property currently over-compensates inventors and authors.
2 Since innovations are exceedingly heterogeneous, the "onesize-fits-all" problem means that certain innovators are inevitably over-compensated (and others under-compensated) . But, what can be said in the aggregate? This is arguably one of the most basic and difficult questions in the economics of intellectual property. An accurate assessment of whether innovators are over-rewarded would offer invaluable guidance on policy. At the most basic level, it would provide a preliminary test of the recurrent proposal of abolishing intellectual property straightway -a proposal that is based on the explicit or implicit claim that innovators are substantially over-rewarded. (However, proposals of replacing intellectual property with other incentivizing systems must be evaluated on their merits.) More generally, knowing whether the over-reward hypothesis is supported by the data would help understand whether policy moves that have unambiguous effects on the strength of protection are desirable or not.
Of course, not even a precise knowledge of whether innovators are over or under-rewarded would mechanically provide a solution to many of the currently debated issues in the design of intellectual property rights. When innovation is cumulative and the incentives of different generations of innovators must be balanced, it is often difficult to tell whether any specific policy move raises or lowers the aggregate reward to innovators. Moreover, the strength of protection depends on many different policy tools, and the approach developed in this paper is silent on the issue of which tool or combination of tools should be best used to raise or lower the innovators' reward. To address such largely unsettled issues there seems to be no cheap substitute for a careful analysis of the opposing effects at work. However, the returns from knowing whether or not innovators are over-compensated are potentially large, and so even limited progress on this front may be valuable.
Various papers have compared the private and the social rate of return from innovation, but such a comparison does not really provide a test of the over and under-reward hypotheses. Because intellectual property rights are distortionary, it is socially costly to use them to incentivize investment in research: thus, the social returns from innovation must exceed the private returns at the optimum. Suggestive as it may be, the empirical evidence that the socially optimal investment in research is more than two to four times actual investment (Jones and Williams, 1998 ) is therefore consistent with both hypotheses.
In this paper I try to directly test the over-reward hypotheses. I develop a simple and flexible model of the optimal strength of intellectual property protection and use what empirical evidence is available to calibrate the model. This provides a benchmark to evaluate whether the strength of protection is currently too high, too low, or is indeed optimal. This direct approach entails two big problems. The first problem is the measurement of the strength of intellectual property protection in real life. In the model, I define the strength of protection as the ratio of profits actually captured by the patentee or the copyright holder to the hypothetical profits he would obtain with infinitely lived, complete monopoly control over the use of the new knowledge. (This definition implies that the strength of protection ranges between zero and one.) In practice, the strength of protection depends on a number of technological details, legal rules and policy decisions made by governments, patent offices, and the courts. The policy variable that most obviously determines strength is the length of protection. The statutory length expressed in calendar time is easy to measure; for instance, the statutory patent term is 20 years in most countries. However, effective length can differ from statutory length and the choice of the discount factor plays a crucial role in translating calendar-time length into a suitable index of the strength of protection. In addition, "breadth" -that can be loosely defined as the extent to which others are effectively prevented from exploiting patented or copyrighted innovative knowledge for commercial purposes -is arguably more important and certainly more difficult to measure than length. The second problem is that existing models of the optimal design of intellectual property rights typically find that the optimal strength of protection depends on a number of parameters, some of which are very difficult to measure or to estimate empirically. As a result, many concur with Landes and Posner's (2003) claim that "the literature on the economic effects of patents is especially inconclusive."
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To overcome these problems, I develop a baseline model that relates the optimal strength of protection to a single parameter that can be empirically estimated, namely, the elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to investment in research. In the baseline model of stand-alone innovations, it turns out that innovators should obtain a fraction of maximum hypothetical discounted profits equal to the elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to investment in research. Starting from Pakes and Griliches (1980) , the elasticity of the number of technological innovations with respect to R&D expenditure has been estimated in several empirical studies, often as a by-product of research targeted at different issues. (Unfortunately, there seems to be no estimate of the elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to investment in research for copyrightable works.) The variability of the available estimates seems limited: most estimates cluster between .5 and .7. Since the elasticity need not be constant, these estimates do not tell us that the optimal strength of patent protection lies between .5 and .7. However, they do suggest that patentees are not over-rewarded if they get less than 50%, and perhaps not even if they get more than 50% but less than 70% of the discounted profits they would get under infinitely lived, complete monopoly over their inventions. In spite of all the measurement problems described above, it seems quite unlikely that in reality the representative patentee gets more than two thirds of the discounted profits he would get with complete, infinitely-lived monopoly control over the use of his innovation. I argue that the representative patentee probably obtains less than a half of those hypothetical profits, and even a third might be considered a somewhat optimistic guess. From the analysis of the baseline model and a review of the empirical literature, I take away a rather strong feeling that the over-reward hypothesis is not supported by the data.
Moving beyond the baseline model, additional parameters come into play. In developing the baseline model I have tried as far as possible to make assumptions that lead to a conservative calculation of the optimal strength of protection. Relaxing these assumptions raises the optimal strength of protection, reinforcing the feeling one takes away from the analysis of the baseline model, even in the wake of precise quantitative estimates of the additional parameters. For example, I argue that with cumulative or complementary innovations the strength of intellectual property protection should be greater than in the baseline model. I also argue that the fact that innovators can often rely on other mechanisms to appropriate the returns from their investment in research does not mean that patent protection should be weakened.
However, some of the assumptions of the baseline model in fact inflate the benchmark strength of protection. In particular, the baseline model abstracts from transaction costs, business stealing, and opportunistic behaviour on the part of firms seeking patent protection. I discuss each of these effects, showing how it impacts the benchmark strength of protection. Unfortunately, while the importance of these effects is undeniable, their size is largely unknown. Therefore, any policy conclusion is inevitably tentative at this stage, and further research is needed to provide a more precise assessment of the overcompensation hypothesis. However, a preponderance of the evidence suggests that patents do not over-compensate innovators currently. It seems that even if patents are distortionary, it would be socially desirable to use patent policy to further encourage innovative activity. If this preliminary assessment is confirmed by future research, it may have far reaching policy implications.
In the next Section I develop the baseline model. Section 3 calibrates the baseline model and tries to assess the current strength of intellectual property protection. In Section 4, I relax the assumptions of the baseline model that deflate, or have an ambiguous impact on, the optimal strength of protection. In Section 5, I discuss the assumptions that inflate the optimal strength of protection. Section 6 summarizes the main results of the paper and offers some concluding remarks.
Baseline model
The design of intellectual property rights involves a trade-off of fast innovation and static allocative distortion. The optimal strength of protection should be chosen to balance the incentives to innovate and the deadweight losses associated with prices that exceed marginal costs (Nordhaus, 1969) .
To analyze this trade-off, I use a simple reduced-form model of innovative activity. Consider a pre-specified innovation that can be achieved instantaneously with probability x at a cost αc(x), where α is a positive constant that captures the difficulty of achieving the innovation and the R&D cost function c(x) is increasing and convex: c′(x) > 0 and c′′(x) > 0. For simplicity I assume that c(0) = c′(0) = 0 and that the parameter α is sufficiently large that all the optimization problems considered below entail an interior solution 0 < x < 1. This model can be interpreted literally, but in Technical Appendix A I show that it can also be regarded as a reduced form of various seemingly different models of investment in research used in the economics literature.
In this section I focus on a stand-alone innovation with no subsequent developments or improvements. I also assume that the use of the innovation does not require complementary knowledge that is in turn protected by separate intellectual property rights. When innovation is sequential and cumulative, or various complementary innovations are owned by different parties, new issues arise that will be discussed below.
The nature and the size of the innovation are fixed. I denote by π the (flow) profits that would be earned by a fully protected innovator and by D the deadweight loss associated with the innovator's market power. Let V := π + D + CS be the (flow) social value of the innovation when the innovation is in the public domain. Here CS is a residual. For example, in the case of product innovation described in fitnessfaq.info Box 1, CS is the consumers' surplus, but other interpretations are possible. To keep the analysis as general as possible, I treat π, D and CS as exogenous parameters, without making any specific assumption on the nature of the innovation, demand, and the competition in the product market. Assuming a stationary environment, the social value of the innovation is r V v S = , where r is the discount rate. I assume that the social and private discount rates coincide. Figure 1 depicts the case of a product innovation. The patentee or copyright-holder charges the monopoly price p M until the patent or copyright expires. Then, the price falls to marginal cost c 1 and society nets a (flow) gain V= π + D +CS.
Box 1: Drastic and non-drastic innovations
More generally, Figure 1 can be easily adapted to represent the case of a drastic, costreducing innovation. It suffices to note that when the pre-innovation cost c 0 is greater than the monopoly price p M , the price falls to p M as soon as the innovation arrives. So, consumers will benefit from the arrival of the innovation even before the patent expires (even though their gain may be smaller than the area of the triangle CS in Figure 1 ). 
CS
By way of contrast, Figure 2 depicts the case of a non-drastic, cost reducing innovation (the case of quality-improving innovations is similar). Here the innovation reduces the unit production cost from the pre-innovation level c 0 to c 1 < c 0 , where now p M > c 0 (not shown in the figure) . Assuming that the market is perfectly competitive before the innovation and that the innovator engages in limit pricing, the price will remain at the pre-innovation level c 0 until the innovation falls into the public domain. In this case, consumers do not benefit from the innovation until after the patent expires. When the patent expires, the price falls to marginal cost c 1 and society obtains the full social flow value of the innovation. Here CS = 0 and therefore V= π + D. This is the case I focus on in the baseline model.
The analysis focuses on two policy variables, the length and breadth of protection. The meaning of length is straightforward. Given duration of T years, it is convenient to define the "normalized" length as z := 1 -e -rT . Thus, the normalized length z ranges from 0 (T = 0) to 1 ( ∞ = T ). To capture the fact that intellectual property rights are limited in breadth, I denote by β ≤ 1 the fraction of the flow profits π that the innovator can actually earn while the patent or the copyright is in force; the remaining fraction (1-β) spills over to somebody else (e.g. consumers or other firms). When breadth is limited, I assume that the associated deadweight losses are proportionally lower, i.e. βD. Later I shall briefly discuss the consequences of relaxing this assumption. With infinitely lived protection (z = 1) and maximum breadth (β = 1) the innovator's discounted profits would be r π . When protection is limited in scope and over time, his profits are only r z v P π β = . Therefore, normalized length z and breadth β combine into a single index of the strength of protection, βz. In words, the strength of protection, βz, is the ratio of profits actually captured by the patentee or the copyright holder to the profits that he would obtain with infinitely lived, complete monopoly control over the use of the new knowledge. This formalization implicitly posits that in the absence of intellectual property protection (i.e., when βz = 0) innovative knowledge is completely non-excludable and so the innovator is unable to make any profit out of it. Thus, I am ruling out the possibility that the innovator can protect his innovation through other protection mechanisms like secrecy, lead time, or the control of complementary assets. I am also assuming that when the intellectual property right expires and the innovations falls into the public domain, the innovator's profits are driven to zero. These assumptions will be relaxed later. Finally, I assume that CS = 0 and there is free entry in research which will drive the expected net profits of innovators to zero. As is well known, both assumptions have an unambiguous negative effect on the optimal strength of protection (see Duffy, 2005) , and both will be relaxed in subsequent sections.
With all these assumptions in place, the baseline model consists of two simple equations. The first equation is the zero-profit condition in the research industry:
This equation says that with free entry of research firms, the expected profit of firms investing in research must vanish. The expected profit equals the probability of success, x, times the private value of the innovation, P v minus the research costs. Equation (1) implicitly gives the equilibrium level of investment in research as a function of the strength of intellectual property protection.
The second equation is the social welfare function to be maximized. I use the standard definition of social welfare in a partial equilibrium framework, i.e. the discounted sum of consumers' surplus and profits, net of R&D costs. Normalizing pre-innovation flow social welfare to zero, the expected discounted social welfare is:
The meaning of this equation is as follows. The innovation is achieved with probability x. Conditional on success, the flow social value of the innovation is [π + (1-β)D] before the protection ends, i.e. for a normalized time length z, and (π + D) thereafter, i.e. for the remaining time z − 1 . Finally, to obtain net social welfare R&D costs are subtracted. Note that this specification of the social welfare function implicitly rules out transactions costs, like administrative, enforcement, and litigation costs. These costs will be discussed in Section 5.
The second line of equation (2) can be obtained by plugging the zero-profit condition into the social welfare function. It says that society obtains a positive net benefit from the innovation only to the extent that it limits the breadth of protection, its duration, or both (Duffy, 2005) . This implies that in the baseline model the optimal strength of protection is necessarily strictly lower than one.
The policy-maker chooses the length and breadth of protection, T and β, or equivalently z and β, that maximize social welfare W given that x is implicitly given by the zero-profit condition (1). The solution to the social problem leads to the following simple "elasticity rule" (see Technical Appendix B for a proof):
is the inverse of the elasticity of the R&D expenditure function. To interpret equation (3), note that with a large number of potential innovations, the number of innovations achieved is proportional to the probability of success x and soη is the elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to R&D expenditure. Then, the elasticity rule says that the innovator should obtain a fraction of maximum hypothetical discounted profits equal to the elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to investment in research.
Several comments are in order. First, the elasticity η is necessarily lower than one given the assumption that the cost function c(x) is convex (and c(0) = 0). This assumption captures the notion that the creation of new knowledge requires at least one input in fixed supply. Such a fixed input may be talent, it may be the set of good ideas at any given point in time, or it may be something we do not fully understand yet, but it is very difficult to imagine that doubling the amount of resources invested in research suffices to double the output -if the output is measured properly.
Second, for any given strength βz, the combination of length and breadth is a matter of indifference, both for the innovator and for society. This result is due to the assumption that the deadweight losses from intellectual property protection are proportional to the breadth of protection β. If this proportionality assumption fails, a non trivial problem of choosing the optimal combination of length and breadth arises. This problem is addressed by a literature excellently reviewed elsewhere .
Third, various parameters of the model that prima facie should affect the optimal strength of protection, like π, D and α, do not enter the formula for the optimal strength directly. In particular, the optimal strength does not directly depend on the size of the innovation or on the size of the market, as measured by π + D. The intuitive reason is the following. A rise in the social value of the innovation π + D raises the investment in research that society ought to make to achieve that innovation. However, for any given level of the strength of protection, a rise in π raises the private value of the innovation and so it automatically raises the equilibrium level of investment in research. In the baseline model, there is no need of adjusting the strength of protection. For similar reasons, the optimal strength of protection does not directly depend on the difficulty of achieving the innovation as captured by the shift parameter α. A rise in α lowers both the socially optimal and the equilibrium level of investment in research, with no need of adjusting the strength of protection. However, a change in the value of the innovation or the difficulty of obtaining it can change the optimal strength of protection to the extent that it affects the elasticity η. If η increases (resp., decreases) with the level of investment in research, a rise in the size of the market or in the size of the innovation raises (resp., lowers) the optimal strength of protection by raising the equilibrium level of R&D expenditure (Grossman and Lai, 2004) . The same is true of a fall in the difficulty of achieving the innovation. In general, it is hard to tell whether η raises, falls or stays constant with the level of investment in research, 3 an issue which is however largely irrelevant to our purposes.
The fact that the optimal strength of protection does not directly depend on the value of the innovation allows an immediate extension of the elasticity rule (3) to the case of heterogeneous innovations. With a distribution of innovations that differ in value or R&D cost, equation (3) continues to apply with no change if the elasticity η is the same for all innovations. More generally, the optimal strength of protection is a weighted average of the individual elasticities, with weights that reflect the values of different innovations. Moreover, heterogeneity raises the benchmark strength of protection in the sense that a mean preserving spread in the distribution of the individual elasticities raises the optimal value of βz (see Technical Appendix B for details).
Finally, the elasticity rule asserts that the optimal strength of protection does not depend on the ratio D/π. This result might seem surprising since the ratio D/π measures how costly it is to incentivize investment in research. The intuition for this result is clearest if we focus on the case of maximum breadth, i.e. β =1 (a similar argument however holds when β < 1). With maximum breadth, any net social gain from the innovation starts accruing only after the intellectual property right expires. Before the intellectual property right expires, D is lost due to the static inefficiency of supra-competitive pricing and π is dissipated in the patent race due to the free entry assumption. After the intellectual property right expires, there is no longer any deadweight loss and society gains the entire social value of the innovation, V = π + D. Therefore, the ratio D/π does not matter. But this does not mean that it is not important to minimize static allocative inefficiencies while the patent is in force. For any given V and any given fixed strength of protection, any policy move that lowers D and raises π raises the market equilibrium investment in research thereby increasing social welfare. However, any such policy move impacts the optimal strength of protection only to the extent that the associated change in the equilibrium level of R&D investment impacts the elasticity η.
The fact that the optimal strength of protection is limited even when D = 0 may seem particularly surprising. When D = 0 there are no social costs associated with intellectual property protection, and therefore it would seem that setting βz = 1 is desirable. However, recall that in the baseline model there is free entry in research. With competition in research, the winner-takes-all effect leads to over-investment. Limiting the strength of protection ameliorates this over-investment problem. On the other hand, it turns out that with monopoly in research and D = 0 it is indeed optimal to set βz = 1 (see Section 4.2). This illustrates the more general principle that the optimal strength of protection decreases with the intensity of competition in research.
Calibration and preliminary assessment
In this section I turn from theory to empirical evidence. I review empirical estimates of the elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to R&D expenditure. This parameter, that fully determines the optimal strength of protection in the baseline model and plays a major role even in more highly structured models, has indeed been estimated in several empirical studies. More tentatively, I also try to assess the strength of intellectual property protection in current practice. This will lead to a preliminary assessment of whether patent protection is currently excessive.
Empirical estimates of the elasticity η
Pakes and Griliches (1980, 1984) provide what seem to be the first empirical estimates of η. Their analysis has been subsequently extended and refined by Hausman et al (1984) and Hall et al (1986) . These papers analyze the time lags in the productivity of R&D, but in the process of estimating the time lags they provide various estimates of the total elasticity η. Estimates vary depending on model specification and estimation technique. In Pakes and Griliches (1980) , the total elasticity η is equal to .61 with a 95% confidence interval from .47 to .76. Hausman et al (1984) obtain an R&D elasticity of .87 using the Poisson distribution and an elasticity of .75 using the negative binomial distribution for 128 large firms. Hall et al (1986) obtain a somewhat lower elasticity of .52 for a larger sample of 642 firms.
More recently, Montalvo (1997) and Cincera (1997) arrive at point estimates of η of .56 and .48, respectively. Crépon and Duguet (1997) find a lower elasticity of .26, which might be explained by the fact that their data do not reject the hypothesis of strict exogeneity. Using more sophisticated estimation techniques, Blundell et al (2002) find a long-run elasticity of patents with respect to R&D of approximately .5. Focusing on the semiconductor industry, Hall and Ziedonis (2001) find an elasticity greater than .9.
All these studies measure the output of innovative activity simply by the number of patents. This is unsatisfactory for various reasons. First, there is an enormous variability in the value of patented innovations. One might suspect that a rise in R&D expenditure leads to a disproportionate increase in trifling innovations, thereby inflating the measured elasticity. Second, one might also suspect that a rise in R&D expenditure affects the number of patents via an increase in the propensity to patent rather than in the number of innovations. Finally, early papers fail to take technological spillovers into account (Cincera, 1997 is a notable exception).
More recent work has tried to address these concerns. Branstetter (2001) and Peri (2005) estimate the elasticity η using regional-level rather than firm-level data.
They explicitly model geographical technological spillovers, which are indeed the main focus of their analyses. By relying on a very large number of patents in each region (e.g., almost 10,000 per region on average in Peri, 2005) , they also somewhat overcome the heterogeneity problem since "differences in the value of individual patents are likely to be averaged out in large aggregates" (Peri, 2005) . If anything, their estimated elasticities are larger than in earlier studies. Branstetter (2001) finds an elasticity of .72, while Peri's (2005) estimates vary from .6 to .81. Arora et al (2005) analyze the different impact of R&D on innovation and patenting by explicitly modelling the decision to patent. Moreover, in estimating the elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to R&D expenditure, they condition on a qualitative index of patent effectiveness that may capture differences in the value of patents across industries. They find a point estimate of the elasticity of .61, and a 95% confidence interval from .5 to .71. This is remarkably close to Pakes and Griliches (1980) . Another study that nicely overcomes the difficulty of measuring the output of research activity is Linn and Acemoglu (2004) . They focus on the pharmaceutical industry, where the propensity to patent is notoriously high and the number of newly approved drugs (as opposed to the number of patented new chemical substances, many of which fail to pass the clinical tests) constitutes a fairly precise measure of the number of innovations. They find that a 1% increase in the size of the market for pharmaceutical products raises the number of new drugs by 4% to 6%. This implies an elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to R&D expenditure ranging from .8 to .85. 4 Neglecting outliers, a prudent summary of what empirical evidence is available is that η may range between .5 and .7 for patentable innovations. It must be stressed that there might be large measurement errors and that the elasticity may vary across sectors and over time. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge there is no available estimate of the elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to investment in research for copyrightable works. Accordingly, the rest of the paper focuses on patents and patentable inventions. Even so, caution should be used in drawing policy conclusions.
In particular, one cannot use current estimates of η to calculate the optimal strength of protection because the elasticity may change with the level of investment in research. However, these estimates provide a useful benchmark to test the overcompensation hypotheses. In the light of the elasticity rule (3), the estimates suggest that patentees are not over-rewarded if they get less than 50%, and perhaps even if they get more than 50% but less than 70% of the discounted profits they would get under infinitely lived, complete monopoly over their inventions.
Normalized length
Where do we stand? There seems to be no direct estimate of the strength of patent protection, i.e. the ratio between the innovator's actual profits and the discounted profits he could earn with complete monopoly control over his invention. To make some progress, I address the normalized length z and breadth β separately.
At first sight, length is easy to measure: in most countries, the statutory patent life is 20 years from the date of the first filing of the patent application. However, the effective patent term is frequently less than 20 years because patents are often obtained before products are actually marketed. This problem is particularly acute in the pharmaceutical sector, where effective patent life has been estimated at less than 12 years in spite of various provisions that extend statutory patent life to compensate 4 In this paper's notation, the elasticity empirically estimated by Linn and Acemoglu is for the time lost while developing the product and awaiting regulatory approval (Grabowski and Vernon, 2000) . Next, in order to translate effective patent life measured in calendar time into a normalized index of length, an appropriate discount rate must be used. To begin with, the long-run real interest rate should be lowered by the economy's rate of growth. The difference between the long-run, risk-free real interest rate and the economy's rate of growth is small, probably 1-2% or even less. However, the resulting discount rate should be augmented by the instantaneous probability that the innovation is superseded by subsequent exogenous technical progress that makes the innovation valueless. Note that only exogenous technical progress should be taken into account here. To the extent that subsequent technical progress builds on the current innovation, there arises a problem of sequential innovation that will be discussed later.
5 As for major exogenous technological breakthroughs, if their arrival follows a Poisson process then an instantaneous probability of 2% means that in each industry a major breakthrough occurs every 50 years, whereas an instantaneous probability of 5% means that a major breakthrough occurs every 20 years. It seems unlikely that major exogenous breakthroughs be more frequent. Finally, it is unclear whether a risk premium should also be included. A careful treatment of risk would perhaps require distinguishing between the social and the private discount rate.
The following table illustrates how normalized length depends on effective patent length and the discount rate. A discount rate of 15% or even 10% should perhaps be considered excessively large. For large but more reasonable values of the discount rate like 5-7%, normalized length lies in the interval 45-75%. This means that the mere fact that patent protection is limited in time reduces the strength of protection considerably. However, breadth is arguably even more important than length in limiting the strength of protection.
Normalized patent length

Breadth
Patent breadth is limited for three broad sets of reasons. First, the enforcement of intellectual property rights is largely incomplete. Detecting infringements is difficult, especially when there are many potential users of the new knowledge. Litigation is costly and may be risky, since patents are frequently invalidated by the courts. As a consequence, patentees must tolerate some degree of infringement. Second, patented innovative technological knowledge can be lawfully imitated to some extent even before the patent expires. "Inventing around" a patent is a strategy encouraged by the law and routinely used by competitors to reduce the patentees' competitive advantage. Finally, patent protection is limited geographically. In spite of the TRIPs agreement, in many countries patent protection is practically absent. One reason why in reality breadth is limited is that limiting the breadth of protection may indeed be the optimal policy. But even if in principle it were desirable to set the breadth of protection at its maximum (i.e., β =1), achieving this result would be almost impossible in practice. To begin with, the costs of a perfect enforcement of intellectual property rights would be enormous. In addition, because of the inherent ambiguity of human language, it is difficult to precisely describe in advance what would and what would not constitute an infringement. This has two consequences. First, there is a risk that the inventor obtains a monopoly over something that is already known and as such should remain in the public domain. Second, there is a risk that the inventor obtains a monopoly over something that has not been invented yet, which would stifle subsequent innovation. In practice it is impossible to avoid those risks without limiting the breadth of protection.
Although it is clear that in practice β is lower than one, it is difficult to say by how much since the empirical evidence is very sparse and indirect. However, two pieces of evidence suggest that β may be tentatively set around .5 or even less. First, in a classic study Mansfield et al (1981) find that in a sample of about 40 innovations, of which more than three quarters were patented, 60% of all innovations were imitated within 4 years from discovery. Unfortunately, this evidence does not suffice to provide an estimate of patent breadth in the absence of further assumptions. Suppose, however, that the stochastic event of successful imitation follows a Poisson process with parameter µ. Here µ is the conditional probability that an innovation is imitated in the current year, given no imitation to date. Mansfield et al's data imply that µ = .23. Next, suppose that "imitation" halves the innovator's profits, since the patentee must now share the market with the imitator. Assume a patent life of 20 years and a discount rate of 5% (the calculation is not very sensitive to the choice of the discount rate, however). Then, the patentee obtains around 32% of the discounted profits that he would obtain with complete monopoly control of his innovation. This is about one half of the effective patent strength of .63 that corresponds to T = 20 and β = 1, implying a value of β of about .5. This is probably a conservative guess. The assumption that imitation only halves the patentee's profit is indeed optimistic, since generally competition from imitators lowers industry profits and there can be multiple imitations over time. Moreover, the process of inventing around a patent, which Mansfield et al focus on, is only one reason why breadth can be limited.
More recently, Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002) have studied the patentees' profit erosion process in the pharmaceutical sector. They distinguish between entry by manufacturers of generic drugs when the patent expires, which they call "withinpatent entry," and entry by producers of new competing drugs, i.e. "between-patent entry." They find that in the pharmaceutical sector "between-patent entry has about four times as large an effect on [discounted sales] as within-patent entry." Unfortunately, they do not further distinguish between innovative and imitative between-patent entry, a distinction that is important for our purposes. Nevertheless, if just one fourth of between-patent competition is imitative (i.e. so called me-too drugs), breadth β would be just as important as length z in constraining the patentee's ability to appropriate the returns from the innovation. With an effective patent life of 12 years and a discount rate around 5-7%, in the pharmaceutical sector normalized length z would be around .5. Lichtenberg and Philipson's results would then imply that it is unlikely that β exceeds .5 in the pharmaceutical sector. 6 Note that this is a sector where patent protection is notoriously considered to be more important than in many other industries in spite of a relatively short effective patent length (Cohen et al, 2000) , suggesting that the breadth of protection is particularly large here.
Summary
In this section I have calibrated the baseline model with available empirical estimates of the elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to R&D expenditure. The calibration leads to the conclusion that the benchmark level of protection is around .5-.7. In practice, normalized patent length z is probably below .75 and the breadth of patent protection is unlikely to significantly exceed .5. Therefore, it seems that the representative patentee obtains less than a half of the discounted profits he would obtain with infinitely-lived, complete monopoly control over his invention. Perhaps even a guess that he obtains a third of those hypothetical profits is somewhat optimistic. It must be stressed that this preliminary assessment is very tentative. Even so, from the analysis of the baseline model and a review of the empirical literature I take away a rather strong feeling that the over-compensation hypothesis is not supported by the data.
Relaxing the assumptions
In this section I relax the simplifying assumptions of the baseline model that are likely to deflate the benchmark strength of protection. The analysis leads to a series of modified elasticity rules, the formal derivation of which is relegated to Technical Appendix C.
Drastic innovations and spillovers
The baseline model assumes that CS = 0. This implies that society does not benefit from the arrival of the innovation until after the intellectual property right expires. Box 1 shows that when innovations are drastic (e.g., the invention of a new good) consumers obtain a positive net gain even before the patent expires and therefore CS > 0. More generally, CS could be positive because of technological spillovers, other positive externalities etc.
the elasticity rule (3) changes as follows:
Thus, when CS > 0 the benchmark strength of protection is greater than with CS = 0 and, more generally, it increases with CS. The intuitive reason is that CS is a positive externality arising from innovative activity and, as such, it calls for stronger incentives to invest in research. For example, with product innovation and linear demand, one has CS = D = ½π and thus σ =1/3; consequently, the benchmark strength of protection rises by a third. (If σ is sufficiently large, it might become socially desirable to set βz =1, since society now benefits from the innovation even before the patent expires.)
Monopoly in research
The baseline model assumes that there is free entry in research. If there is monopoly in research, the equilibrium investment in R&D is no longer determined by the zeroprofit condition (1); instead, it is given by the first-order condition Although the case of monopoly in research is rather extreme, one can say, more generally, that the weaker is the intensity of competition in the invention industry, the greater the benchmark. The reason is that more competition in research raises the equilibrium R&D investment for any given reward to the innovator P v , and hence for any given level of protection. Since the government grants patents in order to encourage innovative activity, and strengthening patent protection is socially costly, with more competition in research there is less need of rewarding innovators.
Complementary innovations
In many industries, production requires the use of multiple, complementary innovative technological components. For example, this is how Gillette describes its latest razor MACH3Turbo: "Protected by 45 patents, MACH3Turbo combines several innovations, including Anti-Friction TM blades, an ultra-soft protective skinguard, a patented lubrication system and an improved razor handle." Although manual razors do not strike us as the prototypical high-tech product, such complementary innovations seem prevalent in such industries as telecommunications, biotechnology, and software.
Nothing substantial changes if a single firm controls all of the separate property rights, like in the razor example. Often, however, complementary pieces of innovative knowledge are owned by different firms. This generates new problems. First, a proliferation of patents held by different owners might prevent manufacturers from obtaining the right to develop the new products, creating the so-called tragedy of the anti-commons (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998) . Second, with complementary intellectual property rights there arises a problem of double-marginalization (Shapiro, 2001) . The suggested remedies, like for instance cross licensing and patent pools, can ameliorate these problems but they hardly provide a complete solution (Lerner and Tirole, 2004) . It is therefore likely that with complementary innovations static deadweight losses are larger than in the baseline model of stand-alone innovations. (In the extreme case in which the tragedy of the anti-commons completely blocks the development of the new product until after the patents expire, it is as if π = CS = 0 and D = V).
One might think that the larger static allocative inefficiencies associated with complementary intellectual property rights should lower the benchmark strength of protection. As it turns out, this intuition is misleading. Consider the extreme case of strict, two-way complementarity in the sense that each innovation has zero standalone value and all must be obtained in order to operate a new technology. The analysis of this case is instructive enough that I present it in some details (see Box 2).
The main conclusion is that with complementary innovations the benchmark level of protection is in fact larger than in the baseline model.
Box 2: Complementary innovations
Consider the case of two complementary innovations. Let x 1 denote the probability of achieving the first innovation and x 2 the probability of achieving the second, where the two events are statistically independent. To focus on the problem of complementary innovations in its purest form, I assume that complementarity is strict and "two-way," in the sense that each innovation has zero stand-alone value and both must be obtained in order to operate a new technology. Therefore, the new technology can be operated, and the social and private returns from it can be netted, only with probability x 1 x 2 . I also assume that a firm can race for innovation 1 or innovation 2, but not both. This guarantees that intellectual property rights will inevitably be fragmented.
For simplicity, I confine the analysis to the symmetric case in which the R&D expenditure function ) ( i x c α is the same for both innovations, and the private value from the innovation is equally split between the two patentees. With free entry in the race for each innovation, the zero-profit conditions then become:
since a firm that achieves innovation i now obtains a positive payoff, i.e. ½ v P , only if innovation j is also achieved. Note that firms racing to obtain innovation i do not internalize the positive externality they exert on firms racing to obtain innovation j ≠ i. As a consequence, there is always a no-investment equilibrium in which all firms stay inactive because firms that would race for innovation i anticipate that innovation j will not be achieved, making innovation i worthless, and vice versa.
Under suitable regularity conditions, however, there is also a stable, symmetric, free-entry equilibrium with positive investments in research. Assume that firms manage to coordinate on the equilibrium with positive investments if there is one (otherwise, no problem of optimal protection arises). In such a symmetric equilibrium, the zero-profit conditions reduce to where I have used the zero-profit conditions to conclude once again that society obtains a positive net benefit from the innovation only to the extent that patent protection is limited, i.e. βz < 1. The reason is that the patentees' profits are entirely dissipated in the patent races, and here I have returned to the assumption that CS = 0. The only difference with equation (2) is that the probability that the new technology can be operated is now x 2 , because now two innovations must be achieved. Technical Appendix C shows that the optimal patent strength is now given by (6) η β 2 = z i.e., ceteris paribus it is twice as large as in the single innovation case. This result directly extends to the case of n complementary innovations: the benchmark strength of protection is now nη. (For a free-entry equilibrium with positive investments to exists, a necessary condition is n 1 < η , which implies that the benchmark is necessarily lower than one.)
The logic underlying this result does not depend on the free-entry assumption and is indeed clearest with monopoly in research. Suppose that for each of two complementary innovations there is monopoly in research, and consider the special case where D = CS = 0. (This special case may arise when the innovation is nondrastic and the demand for the product is rectangular.) With stand-alone innovations, the optimal policy would then be βz =1: since there is no distortion in the monopoly equilibrium, with βz =1 the private value of the innovation v P and the social value v S coincide and thus the equilibrium investment in research equals the socially optimal investment. With two complementary innovations achieved by two different firms, however, each innovator should get a reward of v S in order to have the appropriate incentive to innovate. But even with full patent protection and a total private value v P = v S , it is impossible that both patentees get v S . With a fifty-fifty split of the private value, each innovator has an incentive to invest in research that is one half of the correct incentive. In principle, the private value should be doubled in order to restore the appropriate incentives. Although such an outcome cannot be achieved with patent protection in this particular example, this is exactly what equation (6) prescribes.
Viewed from a different angle, the problem is that with strictly complementary innovations each firm investing to obtain innovation i exerts a positive externality on firms racing to achieve innovation j. This positive externality is an additional source of distortion that tends to reduce the market equilibrium investment in research. As a consequence, it is socially desirable to raise the innovators' reward as compared to the stand-alone case.
What is striking about equation (6) is that apparently it does not take into account the larger static allocative inefficiencies associated with complementary patents. But this is, indeed, appropriate. The anti-commons problem and the doublemarginalization problem lower π and raise D as compared to the stand-alone case. But we already know that an increase in the ratio D/ π does not affect the optimal strength of protection. To repeat, this does not mean that it is not important to cure static allocative inefficiencies while the patent is in force. To the extent that these allocative inefficiencies raise D and reduce π for any given fixed V, they lower the market equilibrium investment in research and the probability that the innovation will eventually be achieved; consequently, they lower social welfare. However, while life is certainly more difficult when several complementary intellectual property rights must be assembled in order to operate a new technology, the optimal strength of protection is not necessarily lower. Equation (6) has been obtained under an assumption of symmetry. With strict, two-way complementarity all components of an innovation are by definition equally valuable, but the cost of achieving them may differ. Therefore, moving beyond the symmetric case there arises a problem of appropriately dividing the profits from the invention between the inventors that concurred to the discovery (in the symmetric case, an equal split is generally optimal). A similar problem arises when the assumption of strict, two-way complementarity is relaxed. The solution to this problem may be far from obvious, and the policy tools policymakers can use to control the division of profits are limited. As a consequence, certain inventors may get more than their appropriate share and others less. In this sense, some inventors may end up being over-rewarded as compared to the socially optimal split. However, it is important to distinguish between the issue of the optimal aggregate reward to innovators and the issue of the optimal division of this aggregate reward. In Technical Appendix C, I show that when the elasticity η is constant these two issues are indeed orthogonal. The modified elasticity rule (6), that is to say, continues to hold independently of the way total profits are divided between the various patentees. A sub-optimal split (e.g., different from fifty-fifty in the symmetric case) reduces the probability of success and so reduces social welfare, but does not affect the benchmark strength of protection. (With variable elasticity things are different, since lower investment in research impacts the elasticity η. However, the effect on the benchmark strength of protection is only indirect.)
Sequential innovation
Sequential innovation is perhaps the most important source of complementary innovations. Consider a basic innovation and a follow-on innovation that cannot be achieved, and perhaps cannot even be conceived of, until the basic innovation is achieved. In this case, two innovations are actually needed for the second-generation technology to be available: the basic innovation and the follow-on innovation.
If the basic innovation has zero stand-alone value, i.e. it is a pure research tool, we have a case of strict, two-way complementarity. The only difference with the analysis of the preceding subsection is that now the two innovations must be achieved in sequence. (This is not necessarily for bad, as it may facilitate firms' coordination on the equilibrium with positive investments in research, helping to overcome a problem discussed in Box 2.) If instead the basic innovation has a positive standalone value, then we have an instance of "one-way" complementarity: the basic innovation can now be practiced even in the absence of the follow-on innovation, but follow-on research cannot start if the basic innovation is not achieved.
Since complementarity is an essential ingredient of sequential innovation, it is not surprising that with sequential innovation there is an under-investment problem. Indeed, models of sequential innovation almost invariably find that there is a tendency to under-invest in basic innovations due to a dynamic externality that arises because basic innovators open the way to the subsequent improvements (see for a thorough survey). Forward patent protection is the suggested remedy for this dynamic externality, and is typically provided through the novelty requirement and leading breadth discusses and compares these policy tools). Another reason why basic innovations need forward patent protection is that otherwise future innovators could compete away the original innovators' profits. However, since forward protection changes the division of the profits in favour of first-generation innovators and against second-generation innovators, it discourages subsequent improvements.
The literature on sequential innovation has mostly focused on the issue of the division of profits between subsequent generations of innovators. This problem is still largely unsettled: the optimal level of forward protection depends on a number of determinants, some of which are difficult for policymakers to observe. However, this issue is conceptually different from the issue of the optimal aggregate reward to the innovators. If the two issues were orthogonal, the way the pie is divided would not influence the optimal size of the pie. In practice, however, things are more complicated. The policy tools that can be used to determine the division of profits may also impact the aggregate level of profits, and vice versa. For example, if forward patent protection is provided through leading breadth, first-and secondgeneration patentees are forced (allowed?) to reach an agreement instead of competing in the product market. This prevents the profit erosion associated with more intense competition, and raises the aggregate level of profits. On the other hand, with positive leading breadth any decrease in the patent life will reduce the share of profits from the second-generation innovation that accrues to the first-generation patentee. As a limiting case, if the second-generation innovation is achieved only after the first-generation patent has expired, the first patentee does not obtain any profit from the second innovation. Because of these subtle interactions between the tools that affect the size of the pie and those that affect the way the pie is divided, the modified elasticity rule (6) may need some further changes in the presence of sequential innovation. Unfortunately, little is known on the direction and the size of this further correction. This is an important issue for future research. As for now, all that can be said is that with sequential innovations the benchmark level of protection tends to increase with respect to the baseline model because of the dynamic complementarity between subsequent generations of innovations.
Other protection mechanisms
Surveys of US firms have repeatedly found that secrecy, lead time, and the control of complementary assets are more highly ranked than intellectual property rights as a protection mechanism for both product and process innovations, and have increased in importance over the last decade (Levin et al, 1987; Cohen et al, 2000) . Cohen et al report that for process innovations, only 23% of all respondents consider patents as an effective appropriating mechanism as compared to 50% and 38% of respondents for secrecy and lead time, respectively. For product innovations, patents are considered relatively more effective (41%), but still less effective than either secrecy (51%) or lead time (50%).
This evidence is consistent with empirical estimates of the propensity to patent and the patent premium. Estimates of the propensity to patent indicate that less than one half of patentable innovations are actually patented. For those innovations that are patented, the additional returns accruing to innovators thanks to patent protection (i.e., the so-called patent premium) have been estimated to be equivalent to an implicit subsidy on R&D expenditure around 15-25% (see Schankerman, 1998 and McCalman, 2001; Arora et al, 2005 arrive at somewhat higher estimates of the patent premium, however). Thus, the incentivizing effect of patents seems relatively small, and certainly firms would have a substantial incentive to innovate even in the absence of intellectual property rights.
This means that the assumption of the baseline model, namely, that in the absence of intellectual property protection (βz = 0) the innovator makes zero profits, is evidently false. How does the elasticity rule change when this unrealistic assumption is relaxed? Here I shall argue that taking other protection mechanisms into account does not necessarily decrease the benchmark obtained from the baseline model. Although the complete argument is rather elaborate, the key insight is very simple: with constant returns to scale, secrecy, lead time and other protection devices can only provide a reward to innovators to the extent that they allow innovators to price above marginal cost.
7 But supra-competitive pricing entails deadweight losses, independently of the source of market power. It follows that other protection mechanisms are also distortionary, and therefore their availability does not necessarily mean that at the margin society should rely less heavily on intellectual property.
To proceed, I distinguish between various cases. The case where other protection mechanisms are alternative to patent protection -an assumption that can be appropriate for secrecy -is analyzed in Box 3. Box 3 shows that when secrecy is a feasible option the benchmark level of protection is likely to be greater than in the baseline model.
Box 3: Patents v. secrets
Often inventors can rely on either patents or secrecy, but not both. (Denicolò and Franzoni, 2004 discuss the legal rules that in principle prevent inventors from relying on both patents and secrecy.) To see how this fact impacts the benchmark strength of protection, suppose that if the innovator opts for secrecy, the invention can be concealed for a time period the expected duration of which varies. The inventor will opt for patenting if and only if his expected profits under secrecy are lower than those guaranteed by patent protection. Assuming for simplicity that the breadth of protection with secrecy is the same as with patents, this means that those inventions for which the expected duration of the secret exceeds the patent term will be kept secret, and the others are patented. Now consider how a change (say, an increase) in the strength of patent protection impacts social welfare. By making patenting relatively more attractive, such a policy move will induce some inventors to switch from secrecy to patent protection. Therefore, inventions can now be divided into three groups: those that are kept secret both before and after the move, those that are patented both before and after the move, and those that switch from secrecy to patenting. Note that the patent premium is negative for the first group, positive for the second, and is zero for the third group of inventions. I shall call the latter inventions "marginal".
A change in patent strength has no effect on the first group of inventions. As for the second group, comprising those inventions that would have been patented anyway, the effect is the same as if secrecy was not a feasible option. Therefore, when secrecy is an alternative to patent protection, the optimal patent strength would be the same as in the baseline model but for marginal innovations. More precisely, whether the option of keeping the innovation secret raises or lowers the optimal strength of protection depends on whether society gains or loses when marginal positive reward with non-distortionary means. It is not clear, however, whether such reward would suffice to stimulate innovative activity at the socially desirable level. As a matter of fact, in the 1983 Yale Survey and in the 1994 Carnegie Mellon Survey, R&D managers did not suggest that indivisibilities and increasing returns would rate amongst the most effective protection mechanisms.
-25 -inventors switch from secrecy to patent protection. If the only social costs associated with secrecy were the deadweight losses due to supra-competitive pricing, for society it would be a matter of indifference whether marginal inventions are protected by patents or by secrecy. (For marginal innovations, the expected duration of the secret equals the life of the patent and so the deadweight losses due to supra-competitive pricing are the same.) In this simple case, the benchmark level of protection is unaffected by the fact that secrecy is a feasible option, although the model may now be consistent with the stylized facts described above.
However, secrecy may entail additional social costs that make a switch from secrecy to patent protection socially desirable and therefore raise the optimal strength of protection in comparison to the baseline model. First, secrecy may impede followon research that builds on the invention (with patents, innovative technological knowledge must be disclosed, allowing others to conduct follow-on research). Second, secrecy does not preclude independent creation by others and so invites investments to duplicate the innovation. If such duplicative efforts are actually exerted, they add to the social costs of secrecy, making the benchmark strength of protection greater than in the baseline model.
If, however, the threat of duplication induces the inventor to pre-emptively license his trade secret, and such licensing agreements allow the inventor to appropriate all the saved duplication costs, then secrets can reward innovative activity more efficiently than patents (see Maurer and Scotchmer, 2002; Cugno and Ottoz, 2006) . In this case, the optimal strength of protection would be lower in the presence of secrecy. Therefore, the issue of whether optimal patent strength is greater or lower with duplication boils down to an assessment of the prevalence and the efficiency of trade secret licensing. The special difficulty of selling unprotected ideas is well understood since Arrow (1962) . The problem is particularly severe when the trade secret information is licensed to multiple parties. In this case, it is often exceedingly difficult to craft licenses permitting the licensors to maintain full control over the trade secret information. For example, some licensees might in turn secretly sell the trade secret information to others. The empirical evidence seems to confirm that trade secret licensing is not very common, and much less common than patent licensing.
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Consider then the case where other protection mechanisms supplement patent protection. If for certain innovations patents dominate all other protection mechanisms both in length and breadth, while for others they are dominated along both dimensions, nothing changes. For the latter innovations patent policy is irrelevant at the margin, while for the former what is irrelevant at the margin is the existence of other protection mechanisms. A more interesting case arises when other protection mechanisms raise the breadth of protection as compared to patents, but not the length. The simplest way to deal with this case is to re-define patent breadth β so as to include any profits that the patentee obtains, independently of the means he uses to get them. This means that β can no longer be interpreted as a policy variable, but the elasticity rule (3) continues to hold with no changes. However, in the measurement of actual breadth one should now take into account all of the patentee's profits, independently of the tools that the patentee uses to get them (in practice it would be impossible to distinguish between the various sources of the patentee's profits anyway).
Finally, suppose that other protection mechanisms raise the length of protection as compared to patents. For example, brand loyalty or the mere existence of barriers to entry may allow patentees to sell their products at a premium even after the patent expires. Furthermore, while in principle inventors can rely either on patents or secrecy but not both, in practice things are more complex. For example, an invention may consist of several components, some of which are patented while others are kept secret. In this case, if the secret is kept for more than 20 years, the inventor's profits will not be driven to zero when the patent expires. A similar outcome may obtain in industries where the disclosure requirement does not guarantee interoperability, like e.g. the software industry.
When the inventor continues to reap positive profits after the patent expires, the benchmark level of protection is lower than in the baseline model. More specifically, suppose that a share γ of a fully protected inventor's flow profits π can be obtained forever, even after the patent expires. The appropriate elasticity rule is now (7)
Note that patent breadth and length are no longer perfect substitutes in this framework.
Summary
In this section I have argued that allowing for imperfect competition in research and for the possibility that society benefits from the innovation even before the patent expires unambiguously raises the benchmark strength of protection as compared to the baseline model. I have also argued that the existence of other protection mechanisms does not necessarily reduce the benchmark strength of protection. Finally, I have argued that with complementary or sequential innovation the benchmark strength of protection generally tends to increase. Overall, the extensions analyzed in this Section call for an upward adjustment in the benchmark level of protection as compared to the baseline model. Although difficult to quantify, such an adjustment might be substantial. Even in the wake of precise quantitative estimates of the additional effects analyzed in this Section, however, their mere existence reinforces the feeling one takes away from the analysis of the baseline model, namely, that patents do non over-compensate innovators.
Transaction costs, business stealing, and hold up
So far, I have abstracted from the administrative, enforcement and litigation costs entailed by the patent system. I have also assumed that the patentee can make a profit out of his patent only to the extent that his innovation creates new social value. This latter assumption may fail because of a business stealing effect, it may fail because agents seek patent protection opportunistically and patent offices and the courts err in assigning intellectual property rights, and it may also fail when patents are strategically used to hold up firms that have infringed inadvertently.
In the presence of transaction costs, business stealing, and hold up, intellectual property rights involve additional social costs beyond monopoly deadweight losses D. This section discusses these additional costs of intellectual property. Some of these costs are fixed, i.e. they must be borne by society just because of the existence of intellectual property rights and independently of the strength of protection. Such fixed costs do not affect the benchmark strength of protection (although they count to determine whether society should use intellectual property rights at all). Some of the costs, however, are "variable" in that their size depends on the strength of protection; as such, they do affect the optimal strength of protection. 
Transaction costs
Clearly, the presence of transaction costs reduces the benchmark strength of protection. However, it does so only to the extent that transaction costs are not borne by the patent holder. To be sure, even transaction costs borne by the patent holder are real social costs, reduce the value of innovations, and affect social welfare negatively. But they also reduce the private incentive to innovate, and therefore do not call for a downward adjustment in the strength of protection (however, they may have an indirect impact on the benchmark level of protection via the elasticity η).
I now discuss various types of transaction costs, trying to assess both their size and the extent to which they are borne by patent holders and thus concur to modify the elasticity rule. First, patents entail administrative costs. The patent application and review process is costly both for applicants and for patent offices. However, to the extent that patent offices are funded through patent fees and patent-renewal fees, most of the administrative costs are eventually borne by patent holders and would-be patent holders. Therefore, it seems that only a fraction of total administrative costs must be financed out of general fiscal revenue. These costs probably represent a very small share of the social value of innovations.
Second, patents entail legal costs. Patent litigation is notoriously very costly. The American Intellectual Property Law Association has estimated the average costs of patent litigation at about one million $ for each party. For patents valued more than 25 millions $, the average cost is 4 millions $ for each party (Hoti et al, 2006) . These figures are striking, but taking into account that 25 millions $ is the lower bound of the truncated distribution of the private values of innovations, they suggest that the ratio of transaction costs to the social value, ψ , is substantially lower than one third even for patents that are litigated all the way to a decision. In the US, less than 1.5% of patents are litigated (Hoti et al, 2006) . Moreover, most cases are settled before trial. Lemley and Shapiro (2006) report that less than 5% of litigated patents are litigated all the way to a decision, and litigation that results in settlement is probably much less costly. On the basis of this data, one can conclude that litigation costs are probably small as a share of the value of innovations in the US. And it seems unlikely that legal costs are larger elsewhere. Moreover, about one half of overall litigation costs are borne by patent holders.
Patents can entail other enforcement costs that are more difficult to measure. Most of these costs are probably associated with the prevention and detection of potential infringements, and as such are borne by patentees. However, non-patentees may also bear some costs, e.g. to obtain technical and legal advice so as not to infringe existing patents. In the US, there may be further costs to avoid so-called wilful infringement. Finally, there are transaction costs associated with patent licensing, part of which must be borne by licensees. These licensing costs can be significant, especially in those industries where the problem of intellectual property rights fragmentation is particularly acute. However, there is no quantitative evidence on their size.
Business stealing and hold up
In the baseline model I have assumed that the patentee can make a profit out of his patents only to the extent that the innovation creates new social value. This assumption may fail for various reasons. First, lured by the prospect of monopoly rents, opportunistic agents may try to seek patent protection even if they have not really innovated, or have achieved only obvious technical improvements. Overloaded patent offices may grant patents improperly, especially in technological sectors where it is difficult to ascertain what is and what is not in the prior art (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004 ). Yet, improperly granted patents could be easily pruned by an efficient postgrant challenge system. However, for a variety of reasons, like free riding or collusion, the system of post-grant challenges may be ineffective (Farrell and Shapiro, 2006; Chiou, 2006) . As a consequence, some "bad" patents may survive and be enforced. Another reason why the patentee's reward may exceed what he contributed to society is business stealing. If before the innovation the industry comprises incumbents holding some market power, the innovator may be able to steal at least part of the rents previously earned by those incumbents. For example, a share of the rents accruing to the author of a new economics textbook may be taken away from authors of competing textbooks (although some rents will typically come from the net increase in social welfare due to the enlarged variety of available products).
To analyze the impact of these phenomena on the optimal strength of protection, I assume that only a fraction 1-φ of the innovator's flow profits π corresponds to net social value. The parameter φ can be thought of as the coefficient of business stealing, i.e., the fraction of the innovator's rents that are stolen from previous incumbents. Alternatively, φ can be interpreted as the share of bad patents, i.e. the probability that a patent is granted in the absence of a genuine innovation. The modified elasticity rule then becomes:
The benchmark level of protection is now lower than in the baseline model.
Yet another reason why a patentee's profit can exceed his contribution to social welfare is that a patentee can use his patents to hold up manufacturers that have infringed inadvertently. Shapiro (2006) argues that the design of innovative products may exhibit a putty-clay pattern: ex ante, the product can be easily designed in various alternative ways, but ex post it may be very difficult and time consuming to modify the product's design. With complex technologies characterized by fragmented intellectual property rights, it can happen that the manufacturer inadvertently infringes on some patents that ex ante he could have circumvented easily (this differentiates this scenario from the strict, two-way complementarity case analyzed in Section 4.3). Ex post, the patent holder acquires a strong, undeserved bargaining power that may allow him to extract large rents from the manufacturer. Shapiro argues that in this scenario patent holders are systematically over-compensated. Formally, this hold up problem has the same effects as business stealing, i.e. it allows the patent holder to obtain a share of the rents that otherwise would accrue to somebody else.
Summary
Transaction costs, business stealing, bad patents, and hold up are all phenomena that call for a downward adjustment in the benchmark strength of protection as compared to the baseline model. While the importance of these phenomena is undeniable, the size of these effects is largely unknown. As for transaction costs, I have argued that they are probably small as a share of the social value of innovations. As for the other effects, it must be said that the available evidence is mainly anecdotal.
It must also be said that to some extent the size of these effects is a matter of policy. The phenomenon of business stealing is typically associated with sequential innovation, and its importance depends on the novelty requirement and leading breadth of basic patents. The hold up problem could be addressed by appropriately calculating damages in case of infringement. The risk of granting bad patents could be reduced by increasing the resources devoted to patent offices, by changing their incentives to grant patents, by facilitating post-grant oppositions etc.
However, even if these problems can be somewhat alleviated, one must recognize that they are here to stay. Therefore, their existence should be taken into account when determining the benchmark strength of protection. The fact that it is difficult to empirically assess their importance suggests extra caution in drawing policy conclusions.
Conclusion
A large and growing literature stresses the defects of intellectual property. This literature helps to identify what may be broken in our system of intellectual property rights and to fix it, and it reminds us that in any event this system is bound to remain highly imperfect. On the other hand, there is clear and convincing evidence that if it was possible to raise R&D investment by fiat, actual R&D investment should be at least doubled (Jones and Williams, 1998) .
Unfortunately, we live in a second best world where it is not possible to raise R&D investment by fiat and even highly imperfect policy tools, like patents, can be useful. This paper asks whether in such a second-best world we have gone too far in using patents to incentivize innovative activity; in other words, and to repeat the title of the paper, whether patents over-compensate innovators. To test this over-reward hypothesis, I have developed a simple and flexible model of the optimal strength of intellectual property protection and I have tried to calibrate the model using what empirical evidence is available. This provides benchmarks to evaluate whether patents currently over-or under-compensate innovators. I have then tried to assess the strength of patent protection in current practice.
The main conclusion of this exercise is that the over-reward hypothesis does not seem to be supported by the data. A preponderance of the evidence 10 suggests that patentees are not over-compensated. It must be stressed that this conclusion is very preliminary and tentative. Estimates of the elasticity of the number of innovations with respect to R&D expenditure may be imprecise and the available evidence on the actual strength of patent protection is sparse and limited. In addition, there is a desperate lack of hard evidence concerning some of the effects analyzed in Section 5, like business stealing, bad patents and hold up, which might overturn the paper's conclusion. At the very least, however, the analysis developed here creates an evidentiary burden upon the party seeking to refute the presumption that patentees are not over-compensated.
As I have stressed in the Introduction, even if the conclusion that patentees are not over-compensated was less tentative than it is, it would not mechanically provide a solution to many of the currently debated issues in patent design. However, this conclusion may help to shape the general policy trend, as it implies that a move towards weaker patent protection is generally unwarranted. Especially in Europe, that is relatively immune from some of the defects of the American patent system, the issue of weakening patent protection ought not to appear on the political agenda. If anything, patent protection should be further strengthened.
Although future research might overturn my specific policy conclusions, the approach I have developed might nonetheless prove useful. I hope that the simplicity and flexibility of the "elasticity rules" might convince other researchers that a more accurate assessment of the over-or under-reward hypotheses is not out of reach, and help clarify what kind of additional empirical research is most needed to provide more reliable answers.
Technical Appendix A: Alternative models of innovation
In this Appendix I show that the model I use in the paper can be regarded as a reduced form of various models of innovation that are commonly employed is the economics literature. For the first two models, the equivalence holds for both the freeentry and the monopoly equilibrium. The most natural interpretation of the last two examples, however, refers to the case of monopoly in research.
A1. Poisson model
Consider the standard patent race model where the timing of the innovation is a probabilistic function of the amount invested in R&D by research firms (Loury, 1979; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980) . At the beginning of the patent race, each participating firm i decides its R&D effort y i and pays a lump sum cost αy i , where α is the constant marginal cost of R&D effort. The R&D effort determines the expected time of successful completion of the R&D project according to a Poisson discovery process. Thus, the payoff function of firm i (i.e., the present value of expected profits, net of R&D costs) is: can be thought of as the "discounting adjusted" probability of success. The idea here is that with a Poisson discovery process, the innovation eventually occurs with probability one, but since there is discounting, a delayed success is valued less than instant success. The associated R&D cost function is x
. Note that it is increasing, convex, and satisfies c(0) = 0.
With free entry in the R&D industry, the zero-profit condition fully determines the aggregate R&D effort Y :
Note that with constant returns in research, the equilibrium number of active firms is indeterminate and only aggregate R&D investment is determined. However, the model readily extends to the case of variable returns. For example, if each firm active in research must pay a fixed cost and the research technology exhibits increasing marginal costs, the equilibrium number of active firms is fully determined. The model can also be used to analyze the case of monopoly in research, and the case of competition in research with a fixed number of research firms; see for details. . Thus, this model is formally identical to the model used in the paper.
A2.Variable timing
A3. Fixed, uncertain R&D costs
Here I follow . Suppose that a research firm has an R&D project that can be undertaken at a cost αc and generates instantaneously and for sure an innovation of private value v P . The cost c is a random variable drawn from a distribution G(c) with support [0, c] and density g(c). The realization of c is known to the firm prior to the investment decision. Clearly, the firm invests when the realization of the cost is below a cut-off value. Denote this cut-off by ) ( 1 x G − , so that x is the ex ante probability that the innovation is achieved. The expected cost is then . In other words, the optimal cut-off is indeed α P v .
A4. Variable quality
As a final example, consider a firm that can create a new product of variable quality. Let x denote the quality of the product, and let v P denote the private value per unit of quality. If ) (x c α is the cost of creating a good of quality x, the firm's profit function will be ) (x c xv P α −
. With monopoly in research, the firm will simply choose the quality level that maximizes its profits. Stretching the interpretation of the model, one could imagine that if a patent is granted to the firm that achieves the highest quality level, with free entry in research a quality level will be chosen such that the profit is driven to zero. To analyze the case of an arbitrary division of total profit π between the two patentees, suppose that the first patentee gets a share γ of the profits and the second patentee the remaining share (1-γ). Assume that the R&D expenditure function c(x) is iso-elastic: 
C4. Other protection mechanisms
Suppose that a share γ of a fully protected inventor's flow profits π can be obtained even after the patent expires. The zero-profit condition then becomes In fact, with business stealing social welfare should perhaps include the reduced deadweight losses on "old" goods, since business stealing is usually associated with more intense competition in the product market. On the other hand, with bad patents the deadweight losses associated with improperly granted monopoly power should be deducted. Although it would be easy to account for these complications explicitly, here for simplicity I abstract from them.
Using the zero-profit condition (1), the social welfare function (C23) now simplifies to Simple algebra then suffices to obtain the modified elasticity rule with business stealing (9).
